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We  have  been  advocating  cognitive  developmental  robotics  to  obtain  new  insight  into  the  development  of
human  cognitive  functions  by utilizing  synthetic  and constructive  approaches.  Among  the  different  emo-
tional  functions,  empathy  is  difﬁcult  to model,  but essential  for robots  to be social  agents  in  our  society.
In my  previous  review  on  artiﬁcial  empathy  (Asada,  2014b),  I proposed  a conceptual  model  for  empathy
development  beginning  with  emotional  contagion  to envy/schadenfreude  along  with  self/other  differ-
entiation.  In  this  article,  the  focus  is  on  two aspects  of  this  developmental  process,  emotional  contagionrtiﬁcial empathy
motional contagion
otor mimicry
ognitive/affective empathy
in  relation  to motor  mimicry,  and  cognitive/affective  aspects  of the empathy.  It  begins  with  a  summary
of  the  previous  review  (Asada,  2014b)  and  an introduction  to affective  developmental  robotics  as  a  part
of  cognitive  developmental  robotics  focusing  on the  affective  aspects.  This  is  followed  by a review  and
discussion  on  several  approaches  for two focused  aspects  of  affective  developmental  robotics.  Finally,
future  issues  involved  in the  development  of  a  more  authentic  form  of artiﬁcial  empathy  are  discussed.© 2014  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd.  This  is an open  access  article  under  the CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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. Introduction
Empathic behaviors towards humans are expected for social
obots to realize true communication, and several attempts have
been made to address speciﬁc contexts (e.g., see Leite et al.,
2013 for survey of context speciﬁc behavior design). These
attempts have revealed that the scope for empathic interaction
seems limited and is difﬁcult to extend (generalize) to differ-∗ Tel.: +81 668797347.
E-mail address: asada@ams.eng.osaka-u.ac.jp
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neures.2014.12.002
168-0102/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. This is an open access 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).ent contexts. The importance of “affectivity” in human–robot
interactions (HRIs) was  recently addressed in a brief sur-
vey from the viewpoint of affective computing (Riek and
Robinson, 2009). However, a deeper understanding of its meaning
article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
4 e Rese
s
e
i
m
e
o
t
c
d
(
o
t
a
p
e
d
d
c
d
m
f
a
2
p
b
(
r
a
r
f
b
G
e
h
w
s
t
s
n
s
p
m
c
H
t
w
i
s
h
a
t
d
2
a
n
• In this representation, the location indicates the relative weight
between both dichotomies, and the arrow to the left (the top)2 M. Asada / Neuroscienc
eems necessary to design more authentic forms of artiﬁcial
mpathy.
Empathic behaviors are thought to be learnt through social
nteractions with humans in the framework of (cognitive) develop-
ental robotics (Lungarella et al., 2003; Asada et al., 2009). Asada
t al. (2009) hypothesized that affective development was a part
f cognitive development, and with regard to affective aspects
hey argued “artiﬁcial sympathy” (Asada et al., 2012) and proposed
lassifying affective developmental robotics as part of cognitive
evelopmental robotics to accurately design artiﬁcial empathy
Asada, 2014a,b). Among the several issues argued in the previ-
us review (Asada, 2014b), I focus on two aspects in designing
he development of artiﬁcial empathy along with several possible
pproaches.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section
rovides a summary of the review (Asada, 2014b) beginning with
motional contagion to envy/schadenfreude, followed by an intro-
uction to affective developmental robotics as an approach to the
evelopmental design of artiﬁcial empathy. Next, a review and dis-
ussion on several approaches for two focused aspects of affective
evelopmental robotics, emotional contagion in relation to motor
imicry and cognitive/affective aspects of empathy follow. Finally,
uture issues regarding development of a more authentic form of
rtiﬁcial empathy are discussed.
. Development and evolution of empathy
A previous study attempted to deﬁne “empathy” and “sym-
athy” to clarify the approach for designing an artiﬁcial system
ecause these two emotions are often mistaken for each other
Asada et al., 2012). However, their attempt did not accu-
ately discriminate between these terms from a neuroscience
nd biobehavioral perspective. Asada published a more accurate
eview of artiﬁcial empathy (Asada, 2014b), based on reviews
rom neuroscience perspectives that include ontogeny, phylogeny,
rain mechanisms, context, and psychopathology as outlined by
onzalez-Liencresa et al. (2013).
First, they claimed that the manifold facets of empathy are
xplored in neuroscience from simple emotional contagion to
igher cognitive perspective-taking, and a distinct neural net-
ork of empathy comprises both phylogenetically older limbic
tructures and neocortical brain areas. These suggest that emo-
ional contagion is mainly based on phylogenetically older limbic
tructures, while higher cognitive perspective-taking is based on
eocortical brain areas. Next, they pointed out that neuropeptides
uch as oxytocin and vasopressin, as well as opioidergic substances,
lay a role in modulating empathy. These kinds of neuromodulation
ay  regulate levels of empathy both positively and negatively.
A wide deﬁnition of empathy may  encompass from emotional
ontagion to envy/schadenfreude as mentioned in Section 2.1.
owever, a restricted deﬁnition of empathy is simply the ability
o form an embodied representation of another’s emotional state
hile simultaneously being aware of the causal mechanism that
nduced that emotional state (Gonzalez-Liencresa et al., 2013). This
uggests that the empathizer has interoceptive awareness of his or
er own bodily states and is able to distinguish between the self
nd others, which is the underlying principle of empathy-related
erms from an evolutionary viewpoint. In this regards, the narrow
eﬁnition may  hold true only for cognitive empathy.
.1. From emotional contagion to envy/schadenfreudeEmotional contagion is an evolutionary precursor that enables
nimals to share their emotional states. However, animals do
ot understand what aroused an emotional state in another.arch 90 (2015) 41–50
Therefore, emotional contagion seems early, automatic, uncon-
scious, and fundamental for later empathy-related mental states
such as emotional/cognitive empathy, sympathy, and so on.
Both emotional and cognitive empathy (EE and CE) may  only
occur in animals with self-awareness such as primates, and per-
haps, elephants, and dolphins although presence of self-awareness
in these species remains controversial.1 Neural representations for
such complex emotions and self-awareness are localized in the
anterior cingulate cortex and the anterior insula (Craig, 2003). EE is
an older phylogenetic trait than CE, and allows individuals to form a
representation of others’ feelings by sharing these feelings through
embodied simulation, a process that is triggered by emotional con-
tagion. While, EE considerably overlaps in deﬁnitional terms with
“theory of mind” (Premack and Woodruff, 1978) which present
in apes and humans (Edgar et al., 2012), and requires perspective
taking and mentalizing (de Waal, 2008).
Unlike emotional contagion that does not require reasoning
about the cause of aroused emotions in others, both EE and
CE require distinction between one’s own and others’ mental
states and forms of a representation of one’s own  embodied
emotions.
Sympathy and compassion seem similar to empathy in terms
of emotional states, but differ in terms of the responses produced
in reference to others’ emotional states. Both require the abil-
ity to form representations of others’ emotions, even though the
emotion is not necessarily shared; however, in empathy, the emo-
tional states are synchronized (Goetz et al., 2010). This implies that
sympathy and compassion may  require the control of one’s own
emotions in addition to this self-other discrimination (emotion
regulation).
There seem to be two  kinds of emotion regulation extensions.
In in-group/out-group cognition sympathy and/or compassion
is shown toward in-group members, whereas opposite feel-
ings are experienced in response to out-group members. This is
called envy/schadenfreude and evolved in response to the selec-
tion pressure of social coherence among early hunter-gatherers
(Gonzalez-Liencresa et al., 2013).
The second type requires metacognition, which realizes a kind
of vicariousness, that is, an imagination of the self as others. A typ-
ical example is a situation where we  enjoy sad music (Kawakami
et al., 2013a,b). The objective-(virtualized) self perceives sad music
as sad (perceived emotion), while the subjective-self feels pleas-
ant emotions by listening to such music (felt emotion). This seems
to be a form of emotion control by metacognition of the self
as others.
2.2. Schematic diagram of empathy-related terms
Fig. 1 shows a schematic depiction of the terminology used
in the context of empathy thus far. The horizontal axis indi-
cates the “conscious level” spanning from “unconscious” (left)
to “conscious with self-other distinction” (right). The vertical
axis indicates “physical/motor” (bottom) and “emotional/mental”
(top) contrasts. Generally, these axes show discrete levels such
as “conscious/unconscious” or “physical/mental.” However, ter-
minology in the context of empathy could be distributed in
the zones where discrimination between these dichotomies
could be difﬁcult. In addition, there are three points of
mention:1 e.g., visit http://www.world-of-lucid-dreaming.com/10-animals-with-self-
awareness.html.
M. Asada / Neuroscience Research 90 (2015) 41–50 43
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dapted from Fig. 2 in Asada (2014b).
implies that the conscious (mental) level includes the uncon-
scious (physical) one. In other words, the conscious (mental) level
exists on the unconscious (physical) level but not vice versa.
The direction from left (bottom) to right (top) indicates the
evolutionary process, as well as the developmental process if
“ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.” Therefore, a whole story of
empathy follows a gentle slope from the bottom-left to the top-
right.
The above arrow also indicates the developmental process of
self/other differentiation (de Waal, 2008), the details of which
are discussed in Asada (2014b).
. Affective developmental robotics
Asada et al. advocated cognitive developmental robotics (CDR)
Asada et al., 2001, 2009), assuming that empathy development
ould be a part of CDR. Actually, one survey (Asada et al., 2009)
ntroduced a study of empathic development (Watanabe et al.,
007) as an example of CDR. For our purposes, we  will rephrase a
art of CDR as affective developmental robotics (ADR).2 Therefore,
DR follows the approach of CDR, particularly focusing on affective
evelopment. First, we give a brief overview of ADR following CDR
nd then discuss how to approach issues of empathic development.
.1. Concepts and approaches of ADR
Based on the assumptions of CDR, ADR aims to understand
uman affective developmental processes with synthetic or con-
tructive approaches. Its core idea is “physical embodiment,”
nd more importantly, “social interaction” that enables informa-
ion structuring through interactions with the environment. This
ncludes other agents, and affective development is thought to
eamlessly connect both aspects. The most related disciplines
re neuroscience (micro structure for internal mechanisms) and
evelopmental psychology (macro structure based on behavior
bservations), aspects both have been overlapping with each other
n social neuroscience.
Two main approaches are (A) computational model con-
truction for affective development including veriﬁcation with
irtual/real agents and (B) offering new means or data to better
nderstand the human developmental process, including pro-
iding a robot as a reliable reproduction tool in (psychological)
xperiments.
2 ADR starts from a part of CDR but is expected to extend beyond the current scope
f CDR.Fig. 2. The developmental process of establishing the concept of the self and other(s)
and their expected underlying mechanisms.
3.2. Development of self-other cognition
The top panel of Fig. 2 shows the developmental process of
establishing the concepts of self and other(s), partially follow-
ing Neisser’s deﬁnition of the “self” (Neisser, 1993). The term
“synchronization” is used to explain how this concept develops
through interactions with the external world, including other
agents. As Fig. 1 shows, the target for synchronization changes
starting from physical objects, then, other’s movements, and ﬁnally
other’s mental states. Accordingly, the behavior changes from phys-
ical primitive movements such as early rhythmic motions, actions
consisting of primitive movements, and actions caused by mental
states such as empathic/sympathetic facial expressions and even
altruistic behaviour. We  hypothesize that the three stages of self-
development that are actually seamlessly connected. More details
of these stages process are discussed in (Asada, 2011).
3.3. Relationship between development of self-other cognition
and empathy
During the three stages in Fig. 2, synchronizations in different
levels occur.
1. Emotional contagion: as described in later sections, emotional
contagion is closely related to motor mimicry, an automatic reac-
tion of imitating the other’s primitive movements. Therefore,
the level of this type of synchronization is in terms of primitive
movements such as cyclic ones.
2. Emotional and cognitive empathy: through emotional conta-
gion (motor mimicry) and development of self-awareness and
perspective taking, a variety of mental states are induced by
observing (estimating) the other’s mental state. The induced
mental state is the same as that of the others. In this sense, this
type of the synchronization is in terms of the mental state.
3. Sympathy and compassion: unlike emotional and cognitive
empathy, the induced emotional states of sympathy and com-
passion are different from the other’s one. This means that once
the agent understands the other’s state (synchronization), and
then he or she feels different ones, such as pity or sorrow (de-
synchronization).
The formation of these different (de-)synchronizations accom-
panies the developmental process of self-other cognition as
mentioned below.Fig. 2 (bottom) indicates the mechanisms corresponding to
these three stages. The common structure is a mechanism of
“entrainment.” The target with which the agent synchronizes may
change from objects to others, and along with these changes, more
4 e Rese
s
o
r
c
e
t
s
a
r
s
s
d
e
T
c
s
o
4
e
T
4
m
(
o
a
t
e
r
i
a
a
m
m
p
c
m
p
a
e
a
H
c
o
e
i
o
t
e
s
e
r
h
e
b4 M. Asada / Neuroscienc
ubstructures are added to the synchronization system in order to
btain higher concepts and control of self/other cognition.
In the ﬁrst stage, a simple synchronization with objects is
ealized, while in the second stage, a caregiver initiates the syn-
hronization. A representation of the agent (agency) is gradually
stablished, and a substructure of inhibition is added for turn-
aking. Finally, more synchronization control skill is added to
witch from one person (e.g., father) to another (e.g., mother)
s mentioned above. Imaginary actions toward objects could be
ealized based on the sophisticated skill of switching. These sub-
tructures are not added but are expected to emerge from previous
tages.
Table 1 shows the summary of the relationships among self-
evelopment, self/other discrimination (and its requirements),
mpathy terminology, and imitation terminology (Asada, 2014b).
he imitation terminology comes from de Waal (2008) which
laims the parallel evolution of imitation and empathy along with
elf/other discrimination, and we apply this process to the devel-
pmental process of empathy.
. Two  key aspects towards artiﬁcial empathy
From the perspective of affective developmental robotics, the
arly two stages are important for designing artiﬁcial empathy.
hese are emotional contagion and emotional/cognitive empathy.
.1. The connection between emotional contagion and motor
imicry
As mentioned in Section 2.1, emotional contagion is automatic
unconscious). An example is an experiment with mice where
ne mouse-A observes another mouse receiving an electric shock
ccompanied by a tone. Eventually, mouse-A freezes in response
o the tone even though it had never experienced the shock (Chen
t al., 2009). Here, the freezing behavior is triggered by its emotional
eaction and might be interpreted as a sign of emotional contagion.
de Waal (2008) proposed the evolutionary process of empathy
n parallel with that of imitation starting from emotional contagion
nd motor mimicry. Both emotional contagion and motor mimicry
re based on a type of matching referred to as perception–action
atching (PAM). Beyond the precise deﬁnitions of other terms,
otor mimicry requires a sort of resonance mechanism from the
hysical body that supplies a fundamental structure for emotional
ontagion (Uithol et al., 2011), and the relationship between motor
imicry and emotional contagion is the ﬁrst key stage to connect
hysical and mental synchronizations.
Hatﬁeld et al. (2000) deﬁned primitive emotional contagion
s the tendency to automatically mimic  and synchronize facial
xpressions, vocalizations, postures, and movements with those of
nother person’s and, consequently, to converge emotionally. Later,
atﬁeld et al. (2009) proposed a mechanism of emotional contagion
onsisting of three phases: mimicry, feedback, and contagion. Based
n this mechanism, people tend to automatically mimic  the facial
xpressions, vocal expressions, postures, and instrumental behav-
ors of those around them, and thereby to feel a weak reﬂection of
thers’ emotions, and ﬁnally experience others emotions.
Sonnby-Borgstrom (2002) proposed that mimicry enables one
o automatically (unconsciously) share and understand another’s
motions regardless of conscious interpretation of the emotional
ituation. Upon classiﬁcation of subjects into high- and low-
mpathic groups and measuring facial electromyogram (EMG)
esponses upon exposure to “happy” and “angry” face pictures, the
igh-empathic groups exhibited a positive correlation between the
xposed picture and their induced emotion. Similar situations can
e seen in case of the chameleon effect, which refers to unconsciousarch 90 (2015) 41–50
mimicry of the postures, mannerisms, facial expressions, and other
behaviors of one’s interaction partners, such that one’s behavior
passively and unintentionally changes to match that of others in
one’s current social environment. This effect is supposed to act as a
social glue because unconscious behavioral mimicry increases afﬁl-
iation, which serves to foster relationships with others (Chartrand
and Bargh, 1999; Lakin et al., 2003). On the other hand, subjects
of the low-empathic group exhibited inverted “smiling reactions”
in response to “angry” face pictures indicating that these reactions
through facial feedback may  act as a defense against negative feel-
ings.
Initial evidence for involuntary pupillary contagion was found
in a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study (Harrison
et al., 2006). Participants were presented with photos of sad faces
with various pupil sizes. Their own pupil size was signiﬁcantly
smaller when they viewed sad faces with small, rather than large
pupils, and the Edinger–Westphal nucleus in the brainstem, which
controls pupil size, was speciﬁcally engaged by this contagious
effect. Activation in this subcortical structure provides evidence
that pupillary contagion occurs outside of awareness and may
represent a precursor of empathy. Their data identify the neu-
ral substrates through which subconscious mirroring of another’s
pupil size may  enhance empathic appraisal and understanding of
their feelings of sadness. This study also shows the strong overlap
between mimicry and emotional contagion.
These observations seem to assume that mimicry represents
some sort of automatic or hardwired motor resonance with another
person’s affective display. However, an inﬂuence of top-down pro-
cesses on mimicry is suggested. Therefore, mimicry seems to serve
a social function in increasing rapport and fondness between self
and others (Singer and Lamm, 2009).
There are cases in which mimicry occurs without an emotional
component and other cases in which emotions are automati-
cally elicited by observing others’ emotional states without the
involvement of motor mimicry. Therefore, mimicry and emotional
contagion are regarded as important, yet distinct and neither neces-
sary nor sufﬁcient processes for the experience of empathy (Singer
and Lamm,  2009).
Sperry argued that the perception–action cycle is the fundamen-
tal logic of the nervous system (Sperry, 1952). Perception and action
processes are functionally intertwined; perception is a means to
action and vice versa.
The discovery of mirror neurons in the ventral premotor and
parietal cortices of the macaque monkey (Gallese et al., 1996) pro-
vided neurophysiological evidence for direct matching between
action perception and action production (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia,
2008). The MNS  seems closely related to motor mimicry because it
recognizes an action performed by another and produces the same
action, which is referred to as motor resonance that could induce
emotional contagion. Furthermore, this relates to self-other dis-
crimination, action understanding, joint attention, imitation, and
theory of mind (a detailed discussion is given in Asada, 2011).
In humans, motor resonance in the premotor and posterior
parietal cortices occurs when participants observe or produce goal-
directed actions (Grezes et al., 2003). This type of a motor resonance
system seems hardwired or at least functional very early in life
(Sommerville et al., 2005).
4.2. The relationship between emotional and cognitive empathy
According to de Waal’s model (de Waal, 2008), EE develops
(evolves) earlier than CE; therefore, the latter might involve the
former in a type of hierarchy (see Fig. 1). However, several studies
have reported that their relationship is not inclusive and that they
are different systems, having different roles, and located within
different brain regions.
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Table  1
Summary of the relationship among self-development, self/other discrimination, empathy terminology, and imitation terminology (Asada, 2014b).
Self-development (based
on Neisser, 1993)
Self/other discrimination (Asada,
2014a) and its requirements (–)
Empathy terminology
(Gonzalez-Liencresa et al., 2013)
Imitation terminology (de Waal,
2008)
Ecological self (Kuniyoshi
and Sangawa, 2006; Mori
and Kuniyoshi, 2007)
No discrimination
– Primary emotions (Russell, 1980)
Self/non-self-discrimination
–  MNS/motor resonance architecture
Emotional contagion (Chen et al.,
2009; de Waal, 2008; Chartrand
and Bargh, 1999)
Motor mimicry (Gallese et al.,
1996; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia,
2008)
Motor resonance (Sommerville
et al., 2005; Agnew et al., 2007)
Interpersonal self
(Meltzoff, 2007; Nagai
and Rohlﬁng, 2009; Inui,
2013; Kuhl et al., 1997)
Self-awareness
– Differentiation of primary emotion
Complete self/others
discrimination
– Perspective taking (Moll and
Tomasello, 2006) and ToM
(Premack and Woodruff, 1978)
Emotional empathy (Craig, 2003;
Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009)
Cognitive empathy (Premack and
Woodruff, 1978; Edgar et al., 2012;
de Waal, 2008; Smith, 2006)
Coordination
Shared goals
Social self (Asada, 2011) Emotion regulation of self as others
–  Emotion regulation
Metacognition of self as others
– Metacognition (Schraw, 1998)
In-group/out-group emotion
control
Sympathy/compassion (Goetz
et al., 2010)
Perceived/felt emotion (Kawakami
et al., 2013a,b)
Envy/schadenfreude
(Gonzalez-Liencresa et al., 2013)
Emulation
Imitation (de Waal, 2008)
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A–  Development of social and more
vicarious emotion (Amodio and
Frith, 2006)
As mentioned in Section 2.1, neural representations for complex
motions and self-awareness are localized in the anterior cingu-
ate cortex and anterior insula (Craig, 2003). Bush et al. (2000)
eviewed neuroimaging studies of the anterior cingulate cortex
ACC) and hypothesized that the ACC is a part of a circuit involved
n a form of attention that serves to regulate both cognitive and
motional processing. Its two major subdivisions have distinct
unctions. These include a dorsal cognitive division (ACcd) and a
ostral–ventral affective division (ACad, rostral and ventral areas).
hey carried out a meta-analysis of reviewed studies, and illus-
rated that controls for affective and cognitive tasks are separately
ocated in these two regions.
Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2009) found that patients with lesions in
he ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) exhibit deﬁcits in CE
nd theory of mind (ToM), while patients with lesions in the inferior
rontal gyrus (IFG) show impaired EE and emotion recognition. For
nstance, Brodmann area 44 (in the frontal cortex, anterior to the
remotor cortex) was found to be crucial for EE, and the same area
as previously identiﬁed as part of the MNS  in humans (Rizzolatti,
005). Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2009) summarized the differences
etween these two separate systems (see Table 2).
Fana et al. (2011) reported some differences in the recruited
rain regions when subjects were unaware of being tested for
mpathy (which they called affective-perceptual), than when they
ere asked to pay attention to empathy-related cues (cognitive-
valuative). While both conditions activated the above-mentioned
able 2
wo  separate systems for emotional and cognitive based empathy.
Emotional empathy Cognitive empathy
Simulation system Mentalizing system
Emotional contagion Perspective-taking
Personal distress Imagination (of emotional future outcomes)
Empathic concern Theory of mind
Emotion recognition
Core structure Core structure
IFG BA 44 VM BA 10, 11
Development Development
Infants Children/adolescents
Phylogenetics Phylogenetics
Rodents, birds Chimpanzees
dopted from Fig. 6 in Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2009)).areas (i.e., the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex [dACC], anterior mid-
cingulate cortex [aMCC], supplementary motor area [SMA] and
bilateral insula), the cognitive-evaluative condition additionally
activated the dorsal aMCC, while the affective-perceptual condition
activated the right anterior insula.
These studies discussed above claim that emotional and
cognitive aspects are in separate brain regions and therefore inde-
pendently processed. However, they seem closely related to each
other. One case is metacognition by which one can observe him-
/herself from another’s perspective. Therefore, the individual self
is separated into two states: the observing and observed self. The
former may  correspond to the subjective (real) self and the latter
the objective (virtualized) self. A typical phenomenon in this case
can be seen when enjoying sad music. Sad music is perceived as
sad by the objective self, while listening to this music itself is felt as
pleasant by the subjective self (Kawakami et al., 2013a,b, 2014). In
this case, the relationship between emotional and cognitive aspects
is complicated. The perceived emotion itself is a target of the felt
emotion, and the situation itself is organized by a cognitive process
(metacognition).
Pessoa published a book entitled “The cognitive-emotional
brain” (Pessoa, 2013) that described how several brain regions
committed to different functions with functional diversity maps
and ﬁngerprints of brain regions. He claimed that there was no
dichotomy of cognitive versus emotional; rather, he proposed
a dynamic network structure. This seems suggestive for ADR to
design artiﬁcial empathy because a uniﬁed architecture of such
a dynamic network is more attractive than the integration of
independent function modules. While we  have not yet devised and
developed such a network, the following sections describe several
attempts in this direction.
5. Several approaches in ADR/CDR
From an ADR/CDR perspective, the following issues should be
discussed:• What is the fundamental mechanism connecting emotional con-
tagion and motor mimicry?
• EE could be an extension of emotional contagion with more capa-
bilities in terms of self-awareness and self-other cognition.
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The main issues in designing CE are perspective-taking and the-
ory of mind, which are essential in self-other cognition.
In this section, we review previous studies, some of which were
ot categorized as ADR but seem related to the topics discussed
ere.
.1. Emotional contagion and motor mimicry
Damasio and Carvalho (2013) stated that a lack of homeo-
tasis in the body triggers adaptive behavior via brain networks,
uch as attention to a stranger’s next move. This implies that
 homeostasis-like structure is needed to design embodied
motional representations. One of the pioneering WAMOEBA
Waseda-Ameba, Waseda Artiﬁcial Mind on Emotion Base) studies
Ogata and Sugano, 2000) proposed a robot emotional model that
xpresses emotional states connected to self-preservation based
n self-observing systems and hormone parameters. This system
as adaptive toward external stimuli to maintain bodily feeling
tability. Therefore, the best action is sleeping to minimize energy
onsumption unless external stimuli arise or battery charging is
eeded.
This study is pioneering in terms of emotion being linked to
elf-preservation or instinct, with robots being capable of display-
ng emotional expressions based on these emotion models. Here,
he term “instinct” means the survival paradigm embedded by the
obot designer in advance to correspond to biological evolution.
owever, it is not clear how a robot can share an emotional state
ith humans. Because almost all robot behaviors are explicitly
peciﬁed by the designer, there is little scope for robots to learn or
evelop the capacity to share their emotional states with humans.
Emotional contagion and motor mimicry are related to each
ther, and motor resonance seems to play a key role in connect-
ng the two. Kuniyoshi and Sangawa (2006) proposed one of the
ost fundamental structures for behavior generation based on
nteractions among many different components including 198 neu-
al oscillators, a musculoskeltal system with 198 muscles, and an
ndometrial environment in the case of fetal simulations. Mori
nd Kuniyoshi (2007) extended the environment to the horizontal
lane under the force of the Earth’s gravity in the case of neona-
al simulation. Fetal or neonatal oscillatory movements occur in
hese external worlds, and self-organization of ordered movements
s expected through these interactions. This leads to additional
nteractions with other agents through multiple modalities, such as
ision or audition (motor resonance). The neural architectures pro-
osed in previous studies (Kuniyoshi and Sangawa, 2006; Mori and
uniyoshi, 2007) are typical examples for the underlying mecha-
ism at the ﬁrst stage of the developmental process of the self/other
ognition (see Fig. 2, bottom left). This type of architecture is
xpected to be expanded in later stages by adding more substruc-
ures focused on social interactions.
Mimicry is one such interaction that may  induce emotional con-
agion, which is linked to EE. A part of the MNS  could also be
ncluded in this process (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009). Mirror neu-
ons in monkeys only respond to goal-oriented actions (actions of
ransitive verbs) with a visible target, while in the case of humans,
he MNS  also seems to respond to the actions of intransitive verbs
ithout targets (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2008). This is still a con-
roversial issue that needs more investigation (Agnew et al., 2007).
Nagai et al. proposed a computational model for early MNS
evelopment that originates from immature vision (Nagai et al.,
011), by which two types of associations were learned: one is
etween motor commands and self-observation, and the other is
etween motor commands and other-observation. Their experi-
ents demonstrate that the model achieves early development
f the self-other cognitive system, which enables a robot toarch 90 (2015) 41–50
imitate others’ actions. Their model could be considered as a bridge
between the ﬁrst and second stages of the developmental process
of the self/other cognition shown in Fig. 2, from the left to the cen-
ter at the bottom. By adding vision modality to the neural system
(Kuniyoshi and Sangawa, 2006; Mori and Kuniyoshi, 2007), we may
expect a seamless connection between the ﬁrst and the second
stages of the development of self/other cognition.
Unlike from non-human primates, the human’s MNS  can work
for non-purposeful actions such as play. Kuriyama et al. (2010)
revealed a method for interaction rule learning based on contin-
gency and intrinsic motivation for play. This study partially depends
on the fundamental MNS  capability and therefore seems to be a suc-
cessor of the Nagai’s model (Nagai et al., 2011). This may  correspond
to a substructure to be added at the second stage of the develop-
mental process of self/other cognition (see Fig. 2, bottom center)
although a direct connection with Nagai’s model or Kuniyoshi’s
model (Kuniyoshi and Sangawa, 2006; Mori and Kuniyoshi, 2007)
does not seem straightforward.
5.2. Emotional and cognitive empathy
The above studies have not been directly related to emotional
states such as pleasure (unpleasant) or arousal (sleep), which are
regarded as the most fundamental emotional axes (Russell, 1980).
Assuming that human infants are born with this fundamental form
of emotion, how can they have variations in emotional states such
as happiness and anger? In developmental psychology, intuitive
parenting is regarded as a maternal scaffolding on which children
develop empathy (Gergely and Watson, 1999). A typical example is
when caregivers mimic  or exaggerate a child’s emotional expres-
sions. This is considered a good opportunity for teaching children
how to feel in realtime (Rochat, 2001), and most adults possess this
skill. Children are thus able to understand the meaning of facial
expressions and develop sympathy toward others as the process is
reinforced through emphasis on their caregivers’ facial expressions.
This is because children empirically learn the connection between
their internal state and the facial expressions of others. Watanabe
et al. (2007) modeled human intuitive parenting using a robot that
associates a caregiver’s mimicked or exaggerated facial expressions
with the robot’s internal state to learn an empathic response. The
internal state space and facial expressions are deﬁned using psy-
chological studies and change dynamically in response to external
stimuli. After learning, the robot responds to the caregiver’s inter-
nal state by observing human facial expressions. The robot then
facially expresses its own internal state if synchronization evokes
a response to the caregiver’s internal state.
Considering the neural substrates related to empathy reported
in past studies (e.g., Fana et al., 2011; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009;
Liddell et al., 2005), a draft of the neuroanatomical structure for the
above computational model is depicted in Fig. 3. The ﬁndings of past
studies may  not be consistent as the experiments were conducted
with different task paradigms and measures. Rather, this structure
is intended to give an approximate network structure. During learn-
ing, the caregivers’ facial expressions, which the learner happens
to encounter during an interaction, are supposed to be processed
in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and/or insula and then mapped
onto the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC). The dACC main-
tains the learner’s emotional space that drives facial muscles to
express one’s own emotional states. After learning, the correspond-
ing facial expression is immediately driven by the caregiver’s facial
expression.
The above process may  correspond to the second stage of the
developmental process of self/other cognition (Fig. 2). More pre-
cisely, it may  correspond to the early phase of the second stages
since the reaction seems to be like that of an MNS-like system.
Moreover, mapping from the caregivers facial expression to one’s
M. Asada / Neuroscience Rese
Fig. 3. A neuroanatomical structure for the computational model in Watanabe et al.
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of our social brain, which may  in turn determine how we behave
towards various agents that we  encounter in our society.2007).
wn emotional state requires at least self-awareness as shown in
able 1. However, at this stage, perspective taking and or mental-
zing do not seem complete, yet. These issues are argued in the
ollowing section.
In addition to the MNS, CE requires “perspective-taking and
entalizing” (de Waal, 2008), both of which share functions with
theory of mind” (Premack and Woodruff, 1978). This is another
ifﬁcult issue for not only empathy development but also general
uman development.
Early perspective-taking development can be observed in
4-month old children as visual perspective taking (Moll and
omasello, 2006) while it cannot be observed in 18-month old chil-
ren. This implies that there could be a developmental process that
akes place between these ages (Moll and Tomasello, 2006).
The 3-D coordinate transformations based on geometric recon-
truction of self, others and object locations is a conventional
ngineering solution, but it does not seem realistic to estimate the
recise parameters needed to reconstruct them between the ages
f 18 and 24 months. More realistic solutions could be two  related
nes among which the second one might include the ﬁrst one. Both
hare the knowledge of what the goal is.
The ﬁrst possibility is the accumulation of goal-sharing visual
xperiences with a caregiver. Circumstantial evidence for view-
ased recognition can be seen in face cells in the inferior temporal
ortex of a monkey brain (Chapter 26 in Purves et al., 2012),
hich are selectively activated according to facial orientation.
ppearance-based vision could be an engineering method for
bject recognition and spatial perception.3 Yoshikawa et al. (2001)
roposed a method of incremental recovery of the demonstra-
or’s view using a modular neural network. In it, the learner can
rganize spatial perception for view-based imitation learning with
he demonstrator in different positions and orientations. Recent
rogress in big data processing provides better solutions to this
ssue.
The second is an approach that equalizes different views based
n a value that can be estimated by reinforcement learning
Takahashi et al., 2010). The learning consequence resembles the
NS  function in the monkey brain (i.e., regarding the different
ctions (self and other) as the same goal-oriented action).3 Visit http://www.cs.rutgers.edu/ elgammal/classes/cs534/lectures/appearance-
ased%20vision.pdf as a general reference.arch 90 (2015) 41–50 47
5.3. Expressions
Facial and gestural expressions are a very important and indis-
pensable part of artiﬁcial empathy. A pioneering work of WE-4RII
shows very rich facial and gestural expressions, and observers
evoke the corresponding emotions (same or different) (Miwa et al.,
2003, 2004).4 Although their design concept and technology are
excellent, the realism of interactions depends on the skill of the
designer.
We need more realistic research platforms (in two ways) as
explained by the ADR approach. One is the design of realistic
robots with the computational model of affective development. The
other includes platforms for emotional interaction studies between
an infant and his/her caregiver. For these purposes, The Affetto
project has been effective (Ishihara et al., 2011; Ishihara and Asada,
2014). “Affetto” has a child-like (1- to 2-year-old) body size, shape,
softness, and appearance. Realizing the structures and functions
required for a human-like impression or behaviors in a small body
is technically challenging. It involves synergistic hardware integra-
tion based on effective and efﬁcient space utilization. In addition
to hardware design, we  are trying to establish methods to uti-
lize the robot as a child developmental simulator for cognitive
developmental robotics and as a stimulus-presenting device for
psychological experiments of interpersonal cognition. Fig. 4 shows
an example of “Affetto.”
5.4. Social behavior analysis
Another aspect of ADR is (B) offering new means or data for
better understanding of the human developmental process. As
mentioned in Section 3, robot could be used as reliable tools in
psychological experiments to ensure reproducible and unbiased
results.
Recently, Takahashi et al. (2014) showed how social interactions
with different agents affect the impressions of mental capabilities
such as mind-holderness and mind-readerness. They prepared ﬁve
kinds of social agents: a human, an android (Actoroid F), a mechani-
cal humanoid (infanoid), a pet-like robot (Keepon), and a computer
that were opponents of the matching-penny game presented in an
fMRI scanner. Principal component analysis (PCA) of the answers
for the impression questions showed that the ﬁrst and third compo-
nents correspond to the mental function score (mind-holderness)
and the entropy (higher values indicate a complex strategy for the
game: mind-readerness). Fig. 5 shows the result of the impres-
sions in two-dimensional space in terms mind-holderness (x-axis)
and mind readerness (y-axis). The human, the android, and the
humanoid have positive correlations between mind holderness and
mind readerness. On the other hand, Keepon (the computer) has
negative one: high (low) mind holderness while low (high) mind
readerness.
fMRI results indicated that these two aspects of social
impressions correspond well to activity in two distant
brain region networks. The dorso-medial cingulum net-
work and the anterior–ventral temporo-parietal junction
(TPJ)/posterior–superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) are activated
by the impression of mind-holderness (red) and mind-readerness
(blue), respectively (Fig. 6). Social interaction with a mind holder
or mind reader may  distinctly shape the internal representationMind holderness and mind readerness may correspond to emo-
tional and cognitive aspects of empathy thought their relationship
4 also visit http://www.takanishi.mech.waseda.ac.jp/top/research/index.htm.
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Fig. 4. Affetto: facial expressions (left), internal structure of the up
Fig. 5. Location of each opponent in two-dimensional space. The x-axis indicates
“
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rmind-holderness,” and the y-axis indicates “mind-readerness” (see text). The score
f  PCA components for each opponent represents the mean value for all participants
Takahashi et al., 2014).
nd network structure are far from our current understanding. Fur-
her, the second component of PCA does not correspond to any
ental property or any speciﬁc brain activity. Future analysis and
odeling are expected to reveal the corresponding properties.. Discussion
Based on our previous review (Asada, 2014b), this article
ocused on the issues of emotional contagion, motor mimicry, and
ig. 6. fMRI of brain regions where activities were modulated by “mind-holderness” (red
eferences to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of thisper torso (center), and an example of physical touch (right).
cognitive versus emotional aspects. In the former issue, we
discussed the possibility of a mechanism to connect physical
and mental synchronization. To do so minimally requires an
entraining system that realizes physical synchronization with
the environment. Fetal and neonatal simulations (Kuniyoshi and
Sangawa, 2006; Mori and Kuniyoshi, 2007) are the ﬁrst step,
and these simulations should be extended to interactions with
other agents. In order to support such simulations, we  need
neuroscientiﬁc evidence for synchronization. Recently, Hirata
et al. (2014) built a hyperscanning magnetoencephalogram (MEG)
system with two  MEG  scanners in one shield room, one for
children and another for adults, and a video display system
that enables each subject to observe the opponent in approx-
imately real time (with some delay), in static mode, or any
other common video clips (see Fig. 7). The measurement and
analysis of this hyper scanning data are expected to provide
basic knowledge about mother–infant synchronization, and model
veriﬁcations.
Studies assessing severely aphasic patients (e.g., Varley et al.,
2001) have reported normal ToM processing. This heavily implies
that language capacity is not an essential requirement for ToM
(Agnew et al., 2007) and probably is not needed for empathy, either.
As mentioned in Section 5.1, self-observing systems and hor-
mone parameters in WAMOEBA (Ogata and Sugano, 2000) were
promising for designing artiﬁcial emotion, and the best action was
sleeping to minimize energy consumption unless external stimuli
arose. However, animal behavior, especially in humans, is gener-
ated not only by this fundamental structure necessary for survival,
but also more actively by so-called intrinsic motivation (Ryan and
Deci, 2000). Actually, falling is a leading cause of accidental injury
and death in children under ﬁve (Joh and Adolph, 2007). Neverthe-
less, they seem to explore their environment using their immature
behaviors.
) and “mind-readerness” (blue) (Takahashi et al., 2014). (For interpretation of the
 article.)
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ystem  (Hirata et al., 2014).
In the machine-learning and developmental robotics commu-
ity, intrinsic motivation has received increased attention as a
riving structure of various behaviors (Lopes and Oudeyer, 2010).
he relationship between empathy and intrinsic motivation is
et to be intensively investigated. We  might consider a certain
tructure of intrinsic motivation as a means to develop artiﬁcial
mpathy. Whether explicit or implicit is to be addressed in future
tudies.
With regard to the cognitive and emotional aspects, Decety and
amm (2006) proposed a model in which bottom-up (i.e., direct
atching between perception and action) and top-down (i.e., reg-
lation, contextual appraisal, and control) information processes
re fundamentally intertwined in the generation and modulation of
mpathy. Bottom-up processes account for direct emotion sharing,
hich are automatically activated (unless inhibited) by percep-
ual input. Executive functions implemented in the prefrontal and
ingulate cortices serve to regulate both cognition and emotion
hrough selective attention and self-regulation. This metacog-
itive level is continuously updated by bottom-up information,
nd in return controls the lower level by providing top-down
eedback. Top-down regulation, through executive functions, mod-
lates lower levels and adds ﬂexibility, making the individual less
ependent on external cues. The metacognitive feedback loop also
lays a crucial role in taking into account one’s own  mental compe-
ence in order to react (or not) to the affective states of others. This
odel should be supplemented by top-down processes that are
ot classically associated with executive function and its associated
eural structures, in particular those in the medial and dorsolateral
refrontal cortices.This system has not been implemented in a functional artiﬁcial
ystem, but it seems valuable to attempt to do so. If implemented,
ontextual factors such as early experiences with primary care-
ivers (attachment), current mood states, and other environmentalht) and child-sized (left) MEGs, and (B) an audio–visual presentation and recording
contingencies could be considered since theses factors are capa-
ble of modulating empathy (Gonzalez-Liencresa et al., 2013). This
would require a systematic deﬁnition for empathy, sympathy, and
personal distress (several papers argue the relationship between
empathy and personal distress (e.g., Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009;
Bush et al., 2000; Lamm et al., 2007) because they seem closely
related.
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